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# abusectl
Abuse reporting for phishing mail. Parses a flagged message, extracts its
indicators, resolves who to report each one to, and files the result to a
MISP instance and to public abuse channels.
**Status: `init` and `parse` are built.** The rest of the pipeline is designed
but not written, see `docs/specs/2026-09-08-abusectl-design.md`. Nothing here
submits anything to anyone yet.
## What it does
```
abusectl init # asks, writes ~/.config/abusectl/config.toml
abusectl parse msg.eml # -> case directory, IOCs offline
abusectl contacts <case> # + abuse contacts via RDAP network, read-only
abusectl report <case> # + report bodies offline
# review the bodies, by hand or in a mail client
abusectl submit <case> # MISP, then the vendors network, writes
abusectl retry # whatever is due cron
```
`init` and `parse` exist today. Each subcommand runs on its own and is useful
on its own: `parse` triages a message with no keys configured at all, and
`parse` plus `contacts` plus `report` will produce a document you can send by
hand before any API key exists.
State lives in a **case directory** rather than in memory, so a review can take
a week and survive a reboot.
## Getting started
```bash
abusectl init # asks, writes the config
abusectl parse message.eml # prints the case directory it created
```
`init` needs to know which `Received` hops your own mail infrastructure adds,
because everything below that boundary was written by whoever was talking to
your server and can be forged. Three ways to answer, at one prompt:
- type the CIDRs, if you know them
- name a provider: `gmail`, `fastmail`, `proton`, `outlook`, `privateemail`,
`zoho`, whose published sending ranges ship with the tool
- point it at a message you know arrived legitimately with
`--from-sample good.eml` and pick your own hops out of the real chain
`parse` refuses to run until that boundary is set. Guessing it wrong means
reporting an innocent third party, so it does not guess.
For scripted or agent-driven setup, every question is also a flag and nothing
prompts:
```bash
abusectl init --non-interactive --trusted-relays 192.0.2.0/24 198.51.100.0/24
abusectl init --non-interactive --provider fastmail
```
Re-running `init` shows what is already configured and asks before replacing
it. Either way the old file is copied to `config.toml.bak-<timestamp>` first,
and any section this run does not set, such as `[misp]`, is carried across
untouched.
## What a case looks like
```
~/.local/share/abusectl/2026-09-08-a3f1/
source.eml the original, unredacted
manifest.json IOCs, and later contacts and per-destination status
bodies/ report bodies, once `report` exists
```
`manifest.json` after `parse`:
```json
{
"id": "ioc-1", "type": "ipv4", "value": "203.0.113.99",
"origin": "received-chain", "confidence": "boundary-hop"
}
```
Every indicator says where it came from. An IP from the trust boundary is
`boundary-hop`, the one address that can be stood behind; anything below it is
`untrusted-hop`, recorded because it may be useful but never presented as fact.
## Two properties that are not negotiable
**Recipient identifiers are never captured.** Not the `To`, `Cc`,
`Delivered-To` or `X-Original-To` headers, not your Message-IDs, not maildir
paths or account names. They are dropped at extraction rather than stripped at
submission, so the tool cannot disclose an identifier it was never given.
Tracking tokens inside URLs count: parameter values are redacted, parameter
names and paths are kept, because the names fingerprint the kit and the values
identify you.
**Nothing remote is ever fetched while parsing.** Not the URLs, not the
redirect chains, not remote images. Following a link confirms your address is
live to the sender and fires exactly the tracker the message wanted. Redirect
chains are read from headers and link text, never by following them.
## Reversible and irreversible
`submit` writes to MISP first and stops if that fails. MISP is your own
instance and is correctable; a report to AbuseIPDB, URLhaus or VirusTotal
cannot be recalled. The reversible step gates the irreversible ones, and it is
also what answers "have I reported this infrastructure before".
Every destination carries its own status, so a retry sends only what failed. A
rate-limited vendor does not mean re-reporting to the three that accepted.
## Design
`docs/specs/2026-09-08-abusectl-design.md` is the umbrella design. Each part
gets its own spec before it is built.
## Requirements
Python 3.12 or newer, and nothing else for what is built today: `init` and
`parse` are standard library only. `contacts` will need an HTTP client and
`submit` will need PyMISP, so a venv in the checkout is the development
arrangement; packaging comes once the tool does something worth installing.
## Tests
```bash
python3 -m unittest discover tests
```
100 tests, no framework, no network. Two of them are not ordinary unit tests
and are the ones worth knowing about. The `Received`-chain test is
mutation-checked: walking one hop too far makes it report an innocent party
named in a header the attacker wrote, and the test fails if that regresses.
And the parser's suite passes with `socket` disabled entirely, so
"nothing is fetched" is verified rather than documented.
## License
GPLv2. See `LICENSE`.
## Development Approach
This project is developed using AI-assisted tools. Code is generated with the help of AI based on human-provided specifications, design decisions, and iterative feedback.
All contributions are reviewed, tested, and curated by the maintainer before being included in the codebase. AI is used as a productivity and exploration tool, while human oversight remains central to all decisions.
The goal is to combine the flexibility of AI-assisted development with standard open-source practices such as transparency, review, and accountability.
|
