fix: redact a valueless query token whole, not as a kept name

parse_qsl reads "?victim@example.org" as the pair
("victim@example.org", ""), and the code kept parameter NAMES because
they fingerprint the phishing kit. A name that is itself an address is
not a name, so keeping it published the recipient's identifier
verbatim (percent-decoded, no less: %40 fools no consumer).

_redact_kv_string now splits the query/fragment string by hand on "&"
and ";" and inspects each token's own name: one containing "@" is a
value that landed in name position and is redacted WHOLE ("?REDACTED"
rather than "?victim%40example.org=REDACTED"); an ordinary name still
keeps its shape ("?flag" stays "?flag=REDACTED", "?t=1&t=2" stays
"?t=REDACTED&t=REDACTED").

This also exposed a second leak reachable through the same fixture:
parse._suspect_segments() ran redact.suspect_path_segments()'s
decode-and-check predicate (meant for a querystring smuggled past
percent-encoding into a PATH segment) against a raw query VALUE, so a
plaintext "?e=you@example.org" reproduced the address in the
manifest's suspect_path_segments flag even though the URL itself was
correctly redacted. redact.suspect_path_segments() now exposes the
opaque-shape half of its check as _looks_opaque(), and parse.py uses
only that half against query values: a query value is always fully
redacted regardless, so the flag may hint at its shape but must never
reproduce it.

Turns tests.test_parse.TestIocAssembly.test_the_address_does_not_survive_any_url_shape
green, and closes the gap test_no_ioc_holds_a_recipient_address had
been passing over with URL redaction fully disabled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R

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