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HtmlBuilder renders parsed messages (and whole threads, as one document,
so newsletter threads don't spawn one Chromium process per message) into
the HTML string the web view loads. Plain text is escaped and quote lines
marked; the cid: rewrite is namespaced per message ("<prefix>!<id>") so
two thread messages sharing a Content-ID don't collide.
Hardened namespaceCids beyond the initial sketch after attacking it:
handles unquoted cid: attribute values, background=/poster= (not just
src/href), and CSS url(cid:...) in both style="" attributes and <style>
blocks, all case-insensitively. Replaced the greedy [^"']+ capture with
per-quote-style alternation so two cid: refs on one line can't bleed into
each other.
CidSchemeHandler serves cid: requests from the thread's inline-parts map,
keyed by the same namespaced string, replaced wholesale per thread.
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Whole-scheme allow meant a hostile message body could reference any
qtmaildir: URL (e.g. <img src="qtmaildir://other">) and have it pass,
with safety depending entirely on Task 11's still-unwritten scheme
handler. Add setDocumentUrl() and require an exact QUrl match; deny
all qtmaildir: URLs when it is unset (fail closed). Document URL
survives resetForNewMessage() since it is a property of the view, not
of a message.
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Attachment::saveTo()'s escape guard compared paths with a bare
QString::startsWith(), which is not a path-boundary test: "/tmp/safe-evil"
textually starts with "/tmp/safe", so a sibling directory whose name merely
extends the target's name would incorrectly pass as contained within it.
Extract the check into Attachment::isPathInsideDirectory(), comparing
QDir::cleanPath()'d absolute paths and requiring an exact match or a prefix
ending at a '/' boundary. Not exploitable today since safeFilename() always
reduces the name to a bare basename before saveTo() builds the target, so
the guard is unreachable via saveTo()'s public interface; comments on both
now say so plainly instead of implying it is currently load-bearing.
Add pathInsideDirectoryRejectsSiblingPrefix, testing the guard directly
(independent of safeFilename(), which would mask a broken guard by never
producing an escaping path), and safeFilenameStripsPathComponents, testing
the sanitiser that actually stops traversal today.
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Accounts use [account.work] rather than [account/work]: QSettings' INI
backend treats "/" as its own hierarchical group separator, so a literal
slash in a section header parses as a nested group and trips
QSettings::FormatError, silently breaking childGroups() enumeration. A
dot carries no such meaning and keeps the format flat.
Saved-query order is alphabetical (QSettings::childKeys() sorts), not
file order; documented in code and tests rather than left to a false
assumption.
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loadOverrides() inserted straight into m_bindings, so two override
lines that normalize to the same QKeySequence (e.g. "y" and "Y", both
"Y" per QKeySequence) silently overwrote each other with zero warning,
contradicting the "a typo cannot bind silently" contract on
knownActions().
Track sequences seen within the current override pass separately from
m_bindings (which already holds the defaults) so overriding a default
key stays silent, but two colliding override lines produce one warning
naming both actions.
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Maps key sequences to action name strings, with hardcoded vim-style
defaults and QSettings-based [keys] overrides. Unknown actions and
unparseable sequences are collected as warnings rather than treated
as fatal, so a typo in the config cannot silently misbind or crash.
Note: QKeySequence::fromString() on Qt 6.11 does not return an empty
sequence for unparseable input (e.g. "NotAKey++") -- it returns a
non-empty sequence whose toString() is empty. Detection uses that
instead of isEmpty().
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