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| author | Danilo M. <danix@danix.xyz> | 2026-08-02 17:32:59 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Danilo M. <danix@danix.xyz> | 2026-08-04 12:52:22 +0200 |
| commit | 18dffc348f722fc79ed336523982541283bc84e1 (patch) | |
| tree | 975f2de0e891dd988c4c19471cc4620a35926089 /docs/superpowers/specs | |
| parent | 5f22f80b6b5cef5e768086338ae4b22120f3e67c (diff) | |
| download | qtmaildir-18dffc348f722fc79ed336523982541283bc84e1.tar.gz qtmaildir-18dffc348f722fc79ed336523982541283bc84e1.zip | |
fix: make attachment path-containment guard separator-aware
Attachment::saveTo()'s escape guard compared paths with a bare
QString::startsWith(), which is not a path-boundary test: "/tmp/safe-evil"
textually starts with "/tmp/safe", so a sibling directory whose name merely
extends the target's name would incorrectly pass as contained within it.
Extract the check into Attachment::isPathInsideDirectory(), comparing
QDir::cleanPath()'d absolute paths and requiring an exact match or a prefix
ending at a '/' boundary. Not exploitable today since safeFilename() always
reduces the name to a bare basename before saveTo() builds the target, so
the guard is unreachable via saveTo()'s public interface; comments on both
now say so plainly instead of implying it is currently load-bearing.
Add pathInsideDirectoryRejectsSiblingPrefix, testing the guard directly
(independent of safeFilename(), which would mask a broken guard by never
producing an escaping path), and safeFilenameStripsPathComponents, testing
the sanitiser that actually stops traversal today.
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/superpowers/specs')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
