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authorDanilo M. <danix@danix.xyz>2026-08-02 17:40:54 +0200
committerDanilo M. <danix@danix.xyz>2026-08-02 17:40:54 +0200
commit485e06b796603ef760576748fbd96bc177d5fa49 (patch)
treecdc94fe5ae06510e90390cb09c291747ca923a9b
parent3e540e8b2c79006524ad11d3629361bde663db27 (diff)
downloadqtmaildir-485e06b796603ef760576748fbd96bc177d5fa49.tar.gz
qtmaildir-485e06b796603ef760576748fbd96bc177d5fa49.zip
fix: scope qtmaildir: allow to the exact document base URL
Whole-scheme allow meant a hostile message body could reference any qtmaildir: URL (e.g. <img src="qtmaildir://other">) and have it pass, with safety depending entirely on Task 11's still-unwritten scheme handler. Add setDocumentUrl() and require an exact QUrl match; deny all qtmaildir: URLs when it is unset (fail closed). Document URL survives resetForNewMessage() since it is a property of the view, not of a message.
-rw-r--r--src/requestinterceptor.cpp20
-rw-r--r--src/requestinterceptor.h17
-rw-r--r--tests/test_interceptor.cpp65
3 files changed, 95 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/src/requestinterceptor.cpp b/src/requestinterceptor.cpp
index 0ce95ca..8fd2419 100644
--- a/src/requestinterceptor.cpp
+++ b/src/requestinterceptor.cpp
@@ -15,12 +15,20 @@ bool RequestInterceptor::shouldAllow(const QUrl &url)
const QString scheme = url.scheme();
// The document itself is loaded via setHtml() with a qtmaildir: base URL,
- // so that scheme must pass or nothing renders at all. This is unconditional
- // on any path/host because Task 11's scheme handler is the only thing that
- // can ever originate a qtmaildir: navigation in the first place; the message
- // body cannot cause a request with this scheme, only reference cid:/http(s):.
- if (scheme == QLatin1String("qtmaildir"))
- return true;
+ // so a request for exactly that URL must pass or nothing renders at all.
+ // This is the ONLY trusted qtmaildir: URL: everything else on this scheme
+ // is denied, including sub-paths of it. A hostile message body can put
+ // arbitrary qtmaildir: URLs in <img src>, <link href>, etc., so this
+ // cannot be a whole-scheme allow; it must be an exact match against the
+ // one URL the application itself chose. If setDocumentUrl() was never
+ // called, m_documentUrl is a default-constructed (invalid, empty) QUrl,
+ // which cannot equal any real request URL, so this fails closed.
+ if (scheme == QLatin1String("qtmaildir")) {
+ if (!m_documentUrl.isEmpty() && url == m_documentUrl)
+ return true;
+ m_blockedAnything = true;
+ return false;
+ }
// Inline parts of the current message only.
if (scheme == QLatin1String("cid")) {
diff --git a/src/requestinterceptor.h b/src/requestinterceptor.h
index 817a4d1..9cc100d 100644
--- a/src/requestinterceptor.h
+++ b/src/requestinterceptor.h
@@ -23,6 +23,16 @@ public:
/// Content-IDs belonging to the currently displayed message.
void setAllowedCids(const QSet<QString> &cids) { m_allowedCids = cids; }
+ /// The document's own base URL, i.e. the exact QUrl that MessageView passes
+ /// as the base URL argument to setHtml(). This is the ONLY qtmaildir: URL
+ /// that shouldAllow() will pass; every other URL on that scheme, including
+ /// sub-paths of this one, is denied. Task 11's MessageView MUST call this
+ /// with the same QUrl it hands to setHtml(), before rendering, or every
+ /// qtmaildir: load (including the document itself) will be blocked.
+ /// Defaults to empty, which denies all qtmaildir: URLs (fail closed).
+ void setDocumentUrl(const QUrl &url) { m_documentUrl = url; }
+ QUrl documentUrl() const { return m_documentUrl; }
+
/// Per-message opt-in, triggered by the user clicking "Load remote content".
/// Never persisted, never carried to the next message.
void setAllowRemote(bool allow) { m_allowRemote = allow; }
@@ -32,11 +42,16 @@ public:
bool blockedAnything() const { return m_blockedAnything; }
/// Called before rendering a new message: clears both the remote grant and
- /// the blocked flag.
+ /// the blocked flag. Does NOT clear the document URL: the base URL is a
+ /// property of the view (it is the same qtmaildir: origin the WebEngine
+ /// page navigates within), not of any one message, so MessageView is
+ /// expected to call setDocumentUrl() itself whenever that URL changes
+ /// rather than have it silently reset here.
void resetForNewMessage();
private:
QSet<QString> m_allowedCids;
+ QUrl m_documentUrl;
bool m_allowRemote = false;
bool m_blockedAnything = false;
};
diff --git a/tests/test_interceptor.cpp b/tests/test_interceptor.cpp
index 498a997..fa0e50a 100644
--- a/tests/test_interceptor.cpp
+++ b/tests/test_interceptor.cpp
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ private slots:
// Adversarial additions.
void schemeIsCaseInsensitiveAndStillBlocked();
void qtmaildirSchemeIsCaseInsensitiveAllow();
+ void qtmaildirDocumentUrlIsAllowed();
+ void qtmaildirOtherPathIsBlocked();
+ void qtmaildirBlockedWhenNoDocumentUrlSet();
+ void resetForNewMessageDoesNotClearDocumentUrl();
void cidUrlDoesNotParseAsUserinfo();
void cidPercentEncodingDoesNotBypassAllowlist();
void javascriptSchemeBlocked();
@@ -112,10 +116,71 @@ void TestInterceptor::schemeIsCaseInsensitiveAndStillBlocked()
void TestInterceptor::qtmaildirSchemeIsCaseInsensitiveAllow()
{
+ // QUrl normalizes scheme (and host, for authority-form URLs) to lowercase
+ // on parse, so a differently-cased spelling of the exact document URL
+ // still compares equal via QUrl::operator== (verified empirically:
+ // QUrl("qtmaildir://message") == QUrl("QTMAILDIR://message") is true).
RequestInterceptor interceptor;
+ interceptor.setDocumentUrl(QUrl(QStringLiteral("qtmaildir://body/index.html")));
QVERIFY(interceptor.shouldAllow(QUrl(QStringLiteral("QTMAILDIR://body/index.html"))));
}
+void TestInterceptor::qtmaildirDocumentUrlIsAllowed()
+{
+ RequestInterceptor interceptor;
+ const QUrl doc(QStringLiteral("qtmaildir://message"));
+ interceptor.setDocumentUrl(doc);
+ QVERIFY(interceptor.shouldAllow(doc));
+}
+
+void TestInterceptor::qtmaildirOtherPathIsBlocked()
+{
+ // Defense in depth: the qtmaildir: scheme is trusted only for the exact
+ // document URL the application itself set, never for the whole scheme.
+ // A hostile message body can put any qtmaildir: URL in <img src> or
+ // <link href>; none of these variants may pass.
+ RequestInterceptor interceptor;
+ interceptor.setDocumentUrl(QUrl(QStringLiteral("qtmaildir://message")));
+
+ // Path traversal off the document URL.
+ QVERIFY(!interceptor.shouldAllow(QUrl(QStringLiteral("qtmaildir://message/../etc"))));
+ // A different qtmaildir origin entirely.
+ QVERIFY(!interceptor.shouldAllow(QUrl(QStringLiteral("qtmaildir://other"))));
+ // Opaque (non-authority) form of the scheme.
+ QVERIFY(!interceptor.shouldAllow(QUrl(QStringLiteral("qtmaildir:whatever"))));
+ // A sub-path of the document URL is still not the document URL itself.
+ QVERIFY(!interceptor.shouldAllow(QUrl(QStringLiteral("qtmaildir://message/cid/foo"))));
+
+ QVERIFY(interceptor.blockedAnything());
+}
+
+void TestInterceptor::qtmaildirBlockedWhenNoDocumentUrlSet()
+{
+ // Fail closed: if MessageView forgets to call setDocumentUrl(), nothing
+ // on the qtmaildir: scheme should be reachable, not even the URL that
+ // would otherwise be the legitimate document.
+ RequestInterceptor interceptor;
+ QVERIFY(!interceptor.shouldAllow(QUrl(QStringLiteral("qtmaildir://message"))));
+}
+
+void TestInterceptor::resetForNewMessageDoesNotClearDocumentUrl()
+{
+ // The document/base URL is a property of the view's current navigation,
+ // not of an individual message's content, so switching to a new message
+ // (resetForNewMessage) must not force MessageView to re-supply it.
+ RequestInterceptor interceptor;
+ const QUrl doc(QStringLiteral("qtmaildir://message"));
+ interceptor.setDocumentUrl(doc);
+ interceptor.shouldAllow(QUrl(QStringLiteral("http://tracker.example/p.gif")));
+ QVERIFY(interceptor.blockedAnything());
+
+ interceptor.resetForNewMessage();
+
+ QVERIFY(!interceptor.blockedAnything());
+ QCOMPARE(interceptor.documentUrl(), doc);
+ QVERIFY(interceptor.shouldAllow(doc));
+}
+
void TestInterceptor::cidUrlDoesNotParseAsUserinfo()
{
// Pin down QUrl's actual parsing of a cid: URL containing '@', so a