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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
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An empty cases string resolved to Path("") = cwd, scattering evidence
wherever the command happened to run. A string trusted_relays (easy to
hand-write without brackets) iterated as characters, failing on '1'
with an error naming nothing findable in the file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
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The query string was not the only place a recipient identifier can hide.
A fragment (#e=victim@...) is published as-is since we report the URL's
literal text, not what a browser would send. Userinfo (user:pass@host)
leaks a credential as well as an identifier, so it is stripped outright
rather than redacted in place. A path segment can also smuggle an
encoded query (%3Fe=victim@...); suspect_path_segments now flags a
segment that decodes to something containing '=' or '@', still leaving
the decision to redact or not to human review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
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Four hand-written messages using example.org, example.invalid and the
RFC 5737 documentation IP ranges. No real phishing sample goes in this
repository: it would carry the recipient identifiers this tool exists to
keep out of reports, and a repository is potentially public.
forged-chain.eml is the one that matters. The attacker prepends two
Received headers naming an innocent third party, so a parser that walks
past the trust boundary reports 198.51.100.7 rather than 203.0.113.99.
Weekdays verified with date(1) rather than written from memory, since an
RFC2822 parser validates the day against the date and a wrong one is
indistinguishable from a malformed header.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
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