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27 hoursfeat: extract URLs and attachment hashes, fetching nothingDanilo M.1-0/+61
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
27 hoursfeat: extract sender domains and auth verdictsDanilo M.1-0/+32
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
27 hoursfeat: walk the Received chain to the trust boundaryDanilo M.1-0/+68
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
27 hoursfix: redact fragment and strip userinfo, flag hidden query in pathDanilo M.1-0/+42
The query string was not the only place a recipient identifier can hide. A fragment (#e=victim@...) is published as-is since we report the URL's literal text, not what a browser would send. Userinfo (user:pass@host) leaks a credential as well as an identifier, so it is stripped outright rather than redacted in place. A path segment can also smuggle an encoded query (%3Fe=victim@...); suspect_path_segments now flags a segment that decodes to something containing '=' or '@', still leaving the decision to redact or not to human review. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
27 hoursfeat: redact recipient identifiers inside URLsDanilo M.1-0/+106
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
27 hourstest: fixtures for the parser, documentation ranges onlyDanilo M.4-0/+81
Four hand-written messages using example.org, example.invalid and the RFC 5737 documentation IP ranges. No real phishing sample goes in this repository: it would carry the recipient identifiers this tool exists to keep out of reports, and a repository is potentially public. forged-chain.eml is the one that matters. The attacker prepends two Received headers naming an innocent third party, so a parser that walks past the trust boundary reports 198.51.100.7 rather than 203.0.113.99. Weekdays verified with date(1) rather than written from memory, since an RFC2822 parser validates the day against the date and a wrong one is indistinguishable from a malformed header. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
27 hoursfeat: package skeletonDanilo M.2-0/+28
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R