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The query string was not the only place a recipient identifier can hide.
A fragment (#e=victim@...) is published as-is since we report the URL's
literal text, not what a browser would send. Userinfo (user:pass@host)
leaks a credential as well as an identifier, so it is stripped outright
rather than redacted in place. A path segment can also smuggle an
encoded query (%3Fe=victim@...); suspect_path_segments now flags a
segment that decodes to something containing '=' or '@', still leaving
the decision to redact or not to human review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
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