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15 hoursfix: strip the envelope recipient in every shape the grammar allowsDanilo M.1-0/+74
The for-clause rule anchored on the clause terminator, which is strictly stronger than RFC 5321 4.4: For sits inside Opt-info, so With, ID, Via or a CFWS comment may legitimately follow it, and its ABNF is 1*( Path / Mailbox ) where Mailbox carries no angle brackets. Only the tidiest shape was stripped. Four ordinary ones published the victim's address in the one header a report reproduces verbatim, including "for <a@b> (envelope-from <c@d>);", which is routine Exim and Sendmail output. Anchored on the address instead. The envelope SENDER survives the cut, since that is what the report is about, and the leftover whitespace, orphan separator and emptied comment are tidied because the line is published to a third party verbatim. Table-driven over all five shapes; reverting the regex fails six of nine tests in the class. Two accepted disclosures are now named in the spec's "Where the headers come from" rather than living in a test comment: our own relay's hostname, which the by and authserv-id clauses carry by construction, and attacker-controlled free text in Subject and the From display name, which the whitelist does not and should not filter. The second is asserted as a documented limit so it reads as deliberate, and the manifest assertion now bars the obfuscated you%40example.org spelling alongside the plain one. case.create() seeds an empty headers block so an unparsed case has the same shape as a parsed one. Additive, so FORMAT_VERSION is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xj1ayFRSUQ2u7cwb3S4axE
15 hoursfeat: store a whitelist of publishable headers in the manifestDanilo M.1-0/+62
report must never open source.eml, so parse decides once what may be published and report formats only what it is given. To, Cc, Delivered-To and X-Original-To are absent by construction rather than stripped. Received is cut to the boundary hop alone, in both directions. Above it are our own relays; below it is the attacker's own writing, and a forged chain names an innocent third party there, so publishing a hop below the boundary puts someone else's address into a report a desk will act on. That is the third property applied to disclosure rather than to sending_ip(). Truncating the chain was not sufficient on its own: the surviving line is written by our own relay and records the envelope recipient in its optional "for <addr>" clause, so the whitelist alone would have published the victim's address verbatim in the one header a report reproduces in full. The clause is removed and the rest of the hop kept. The manifest-wide "no example.org" assertion is narrowed to the headers block only, where the whitelist deliberately publishes our receiving relay's name in a by/authserv-id clause. The address itself is still barred there, asserted separately. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Xj1ayFRSUQ2u7cwb3S4axE
41 hoursfeat: report List-Unsubscribe urls and a differing SenderDanilo M.1-0/+17
A sweep of the user's real spam found List-Unsubscribe naming a domain that appeared nowhere else in the message. It is attacker infrastructure and was going unreported. Every url from that header goes through redact.url() like a body url: an unsubscribe link has to say who is unsubscribing, which makes it one of the likeliest carriers of a recipient token. mailto: entries are skipped rather than redacted, since the address is the whole value and nothing useful survives removing it. Sender is collected on the same terms as Reply-To, included only when it differs from From. One repeating From is noise; one naming a separate relay is the infrastructure behind the run. Also drops the unused urlencode import left in redact.py when _redact_kv_string stopped using urllib to rebuild the query string. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019NHaqA1Rz5ybed7wFUeQbK
41 hoursfeat: flag an address spoofed into a display nameDanilo M.1-0/+16
A display name naming a recognisable address is a deliberate act and a real signal, so it is reported rather than merely ignored once _domain_of() stopped mistaking it for the sender. The IOC carries no value. One of the identities an attacker impersonates is the recipient themselves, so publishing the impersonated domain would leak the recipient's own domain in exactly the case worth flagging. What travels is only that it happened; the reviewer has the message and can see who was impersonated, and a third party does not need to. display_name_addresses() still returns the full address for local review. Only the published IOC list is stripped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019NHaqA1Rz5ybed7wFUeQbK
41 hoursfix: take the sender domain from the address, not the display nameDanilo M.1-0/+7
_ADDR_DOMAIN.search() returned the first @domain anywhere in the raw header text. A display name sits before the angle brackets and is attacker-controlled, so it won. Two ways that reached a published report. The sender was misattributed: "Billing at billing@innocent.example" <phish@sender.example.invalid> filed the report against a third party who sent nothing. And it defeated the structural guarantee in sender_domains(): the module reads no recipient header, but an attacker who writes the victim's own address into the display name hands it one anyway, and it came back out as a sender domain. parseaddr() parses the header grammar rather than scanning it, so a quoted display name cannot supply the address. leaky.eml's display name now carries the recipient address. The existing test_no_ioc_holds_a_recipient_address assertion catches this class; it was green before only because the fixture used a harmless domain. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019NHaqA1Rz5ybed7wFUeQbK
42 hoursfix: prefer the observed address over an attacker's HELO literalDanilo M.1-0/+22
_extract_ip returned the FIRST bracketed IP in a Received header value. Postfix (and others) write the client's own HELO/EHLO argument first and the address it actually observed on the connection second: Received: from [198.51.100.7] (unknown [203.0.113.99]) by mx... The first bracket is entirely attacker-chosen; a client can HELO with any literal it likes. sending_ip() returned 198.51.100.7, reporting whoever the attacker named rather than 203.0.113.99, the address the accepting server itself wrote. This needs no forged extra hop, only a client that HELOs with an address literal, and the module's own docstring already stated the intended answer ("the bracketed literal after the connecting hostname") without the code implementing it. _extract_ip now collects every bracketed, ipaddress-valid literal with its position and, when there is more than one, prefers the last one appearing before " by " (the accepting server's own clause, and the one closest to it). A header with a single bracketed IP or no " by " token keeps the previous single-candidate behaviour, so simple.eml (203.0.113.42) and forged-chain.eml (203.0.113.99, item 3's own mutation-checked test) are unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
42 hourstest: wire leaky.eml into the anti-leak suite (red, defect 2)Danilo M.1-1/+9
test_no_ioc_holds_a_recipient_address grepped for the literal "example.org", and every existing fixture hides the recipient address as base64, so URL redaction could be disabled entirely and both this test and test_cli's counterpart stayed green. leaky.eml carries you@example.org in five URL shapes plus a From display-name trap. Adding it to the fixture list, plus a new test asserting on the raw address and its percent-encoded form, turns the suite red: the valueless-query-parameter defect (redact.py) currently lets ?victim@example.org through as a kept parameter NAME. Left failing on purpose; the next commit fixes redact.py and turns it green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
44 hoursfeat: assemble IOCs in the manifest's shapeDanilo M.1-0/+63
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
44 hoursfeat: extract URLs and attachment hashes, fetching nothingDanilo M.1-0/+61
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
44 hoursfeat: extract sender domains and auth verdictsDanilo M.1-0/+32
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R
44 hoursfeat: walk the Received chain to the trust boundaryDanilo M.1-0/+68
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KphFXTc2QajxXsHWyvGJ4R